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ABSTRACT  
 
The paper presents several novel techniques for detection of 
spoofing/meaconing signals using the direction-of-arrival 
(DOA) measurements available in a multi-antenna navigation 
receiver. The detection is based on comparison and 
statistically testing of the measured DOAs against the 
expected DOAs. The expected DOAs are computed in the 
receiver using the almanac and ephemeris. The attitude of the 
antenna array is assumed to be unknown and therefore has to 
be estimated as part of a joint spoofing detection/estimation 
problem. It is shown that the statistics of the DOA estimation 
error for a signal heavily depends on the elevation of the 
relevant satellite in the local antenna coordinate system. 
Therefore, an extended technique for joint spoofing detection 
and attitude estimation is proposed which incorporates signal 
and elevation specific statistical information about DOA 
errors. The performance of the new approach is analyzed 
through simulations. An extension of the developed snapshot 
based approach to a sequential approach is proposed. It is 
shown that new sequential techniques offer great potential for 
increasing the performance of joint spoofing detection and 
attitude estimation compared to snapshot based techniques 
while at the same time the complexity can be significantly 
reduced. 
 
I. Introduction 
The threat of spoofing attacks is a serious problem for civil 
GNSS applications with safety content, such as airplane 
landing or ship navigation in a harbor [1] [13]. Also many 
strategically important infrastructures such as electric power 
grids or mobile communications networks are becoming 
increasingly dependent on GNSS services. In contrast to 
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military GNSS users which solve the problem to a large 
extent by utilizing encrypted signals, civil GNSS receivers 
have to live today and most probably in the near and mid 
future with unencrypted signals of open GNSS services. 
Therefore, such receivers have to be protected by additional 
receiver-sided techniques, which are able to detect and 
mitigate spoofing attacks.  
Adequate solutions for the GNSS spoofing problem are 
subject of intensive research, see e.g. [1][2][5][6][7] 
[14][15][16]. A number of receiver-autonomous spoofing 
detection techniques have been proposed. In order to detect 
the presence of a spoofing attack these techniques rely on the 
observation of the signal power [1], the Doppler frequency 
offset [5], the PRN code delay and its change rate[1][6], the 
correlation function shape as well as the cross-correlation of 
the signal components at different carrier frequencies 
[1][5][6]. The advanced protection against even the most 
sophisticated spoofing attacks can be provided by the use of 
multiple antennas [7]. This comes from the fact that the 
differential carrier phases of a signal observed at different 
antennas depend on the direction of arrival of the signal. 
Using this, a receiver with an antenna array is able to estimate 
the directions of arrival of the GNSS signals [8] and detect 
the spoofing attack if unexpected directions of arrival occur - 
especially if a large part of the signals come from a single 
direction [2]. Moreover the malicious signals can be mitigated 
by generating a spatial zero in the array antenna reception 
pattern in the direction of the spoofing source.  
The use of the multi-antenna based approach for spoofing 
detection and mitigation was investigated by the authors of 
this paper in [2][3][4] and is shortly reviewed in Section II of 
this paper. A technique for joint spoofing detection and 
antenna attitude estimation was developed which uses 
estimated signal directions of arrival.  The detection is based 
on testing the observed directions-of-arrival (DOAs) of the 
satellite signals against the predicted DOAs. The latter are 
computed while solving for the user position, velocity and 
time (PVT).  This is due to the fact that the direction of arrival 
of a satellite signal is required to calculate the corresponding 
errors corrections for the signal delay in ionosphere and 
troposphere.  To estimate the direction to the satellite, the 
PVT module of the user receiver makes use of the ephemeris 
information in the navigation message and the latest user 
position estimate.  These predicted DOAs are obtained in the 
user local east-north-up (ENU) coordinates. Because the 
attitude of the antenna array in the local ENU coordinates is 
not necessarily known, the spoofing detection is treated as a 
joint detection (i.e. of spoofing attack) and estimation (i.e. of 
attitude) problem. The main challenge in this process is to 
exploit antenna attitude information for reliable spoofing 
detection and at the same time to ensure that spoofed signals 
do not have any impact on the attitude estimation. In order to 
achieve this goal the approach analyzes within the joint 
spoofing detection and attitude estimation optimization 
problem several hypotheses about unspoofed subsets of all 
received signals and follows decision metrics which are 
similar to receiver autonomous integrity monitoring (RAIM) 
in order to identify the authentic signals [2].   
The accuracy of direction-of-arrival estimation in planar 
antenna arrays is highly elevation dependent. Moreover, due 
to electromagnetic coupling between antenna elements the 
estimation accuracy of DOAs may also heavily vary over 
azimuth. The latter applies especially for miniaturized 
antenna arrays with antenna element spacing well below half 
of the wavelength of the used radio waves. Such antenna 
arrays are of high interest in mobile applications, since they 
have a similar size and form factor as conventional antennas 
(e.g. ARINC antenna form factor in aeronautics). 
The techniques developed in [2][3][4]  suffer from the effect 
that they are snapshot based and cannot cope with the 
direction dependent estimation quality of DOAs. This leads to 
suboptimal estimation results for attitude and spoofing 
detection. This paper presents a novel, non-iterative and 
optimal approach for joint spoofing detection and attitude 
estimation which takes the different qualities of input data 
into account. For that purpose the directional dependency of 
DOA estimation errors in typical scenarios is characterized by 
analyzing measurement data. 
In typical scenarios in mobility on land, on sea and in the air, 
the attitude of the user platform (e.g. vehicle, ship, aircraft) 
does not change suddenly but with limited turn rates and turn 
rate changes. Therefore, the knowledge about attitude in a 
certain epoch can be exploited for the attitude estimation in 
following epochs as a priori knowledge. In this paper, the 
aforementioned snapshot based technique will be further 
extended to a new sequential technique for joint spoofing 
detection and attitude estimation which exploits the limited 
changes in attitude.  
It is quite likely that a spoofing scenario does not change 
suddenly from epoch to epoch, e.g. that for several 
consecutive epochs the same signals can be expected to be 
affected by spoofing. In this case, the knowledge from one 
epoch about subsets of trustful/authentic signals (and spoofed 
signals, respectively) can be exploited as a priori information 
in following epochs. The paper introduces an extension to the 
new sequential technique proposed above which exploits this 
a priori information. This approach allows significantly 
reducing the complexity of the overall technique since the 
average number of hypothesis to follow can be significantly 
reduced while at the same time the probability of correct 
spoofing detection in not affected.  
The paper is organized as follows: In the following section 
the basic idea of joint attitude estimation and spoofing 
detection is revisited and the relevant signal model is 
introduced. In Section III the dependency of the DOA 
estimation error with respect to the DOA to be estimated is 
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analyzed. It is shown that an elevation dependency of the 
estimation error has to be considered. In Section IV benefit is 
taken of the elevation dependent error model and an improved 
approach for joint attitude estimation and spoofing detection 
is proposed. In Section V the new approach is extended from 
snapshot based processing to sequential processing. Finally, 
Section VI concludes the paper. 
The investigations are performed using a vector-matrix 
notation.  Vectors and matrices are printed in bold face using 
lower case and upper case letters, respectively. In the analysis 
 denotes the Euclidean norm of the vector or matrix in 
brackets and estimated quantities are marked by “^ ” (hat).  
 
 
 
II. Antenna Based Joint Attitude Estimation and 
Spoofing Detection Revisited 
The spoofing detection technique introduced in [2][3][4] is 
based on the discrimination between the counterfeit and 
authentic GNSS signals by using the information about the 
directions of arrival of these signals. The detection process 
requires two pieces of such information (see Fig. 1). The first 
piece is the estimation of the actual DOAs by using one of 
suitable array signal processing algorithms [9][10]. These 
DOA measurements, usually in form of azimuth and elevation 
angles, refer to the local coordinate frame of the antenna 
array.  
The second piece of the directional information is obtained as 
a side product of the receiver positioning solution. Once the 
user position is estimated, a set of unit vectors ሼ܉௡ሽ௡ୀଵே , 	܉௡ ∈ Թଷൈଵ  pointing from the user to each of ܰ visible 
navigation satellites with valid ephemeris can be computed in 
the local geodetic east-north-up (ENU) coordinate frame. The 
effect of the positioning error on the vectors ሼ܉௡ሽ௡ୀଵே  can be 
neglected due to the large ranges to the MEO orbit navigation 
satellites. 
Without loss of generality it will be further assumed that the 
antenna coordinates and the local ENU frames have the same 
origin but are generally not aligned, e.g. the antenna 
coordinates can be seen as a rotated version of the ENU 
frame. This rotation is characterized by the corresponding 
Euler angles roll ݎ, pitch ݌ and yaw ݕ angles, which 
characterize the attitude of the antenna platform, see for 
example [11] for more details. Considering first an ideal case 
of error-free DOA measurements, the axis rotation matrix can 
be described as follows 
  
 ܊௡ ൌ ܀ሺݎ, ݌, ݕሻ܉௡,  1 ൑ ݊ ൑ ܰ, (1)
where ܊௡ ∈ Թଷൈଵ is a unit vector pointing to the ݊th satellite 
in the antenna local coordinates, while ሼ܊௡ሽ௡ୀଵே  being the 
entire set of the error-free DOA measurements, and 
܀ሺݎ, ݌, ݕሻ 	∈ ܱܵሺ3ሻ ⊂ Թଷ is the rotation matrix. This matrix 
is unitary, i.e. ܀୘܀ ൌ ۷, and its elements are determined by 
the Euler angles [11]. 
Since in practice the ݊-th DOA measurement is a noise-
corrupted estimate ܊መ ௡ of ܊௡, an additional rotation matrix ܀௡ࣨ  
describing the DOA measurement error should be introduced  
 
 ܊መ ௡ ൌ ܀௡ࣨ ܀ሺݎ, ݌, ݕሻ܉௡,  1 ൑ ݊ ൑ ܰ. (2)
 
As addressed in [2][3][4] the maximum likelihood estimation 
of the rotation matrix ܀෡ can be obtained by minimizing the 
distance between ܊መ ௡ and ܊௡ as follows 
 
 
܀෡ ൌ arg
∀௥,௣,௬
min෍ฮ܀ሺݎ, ݌, ݕሻ܉௡ െ ܊መ ௡ฮଶ
ே
௡ୀଵ
 (3)
 
or by using a matrix notation for each set of DOA unit vectors 
 
 ܀෡ ൌ arg
∀௥,௣,௬
minฮ܀ሺݎ, ݌, ݕሻۯ െ ۰෡ฮଶ  (4)
where ۯ ൌ	 ሾ܉ଵ,… , ܉ேሿ	, ۯ ∈ Թଷൈே and ۰෡ ൌ 	 ൣ܊መ ૚, … , ܊መ ே൧	, 
۰෡ ∈ Թଷൈே. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1 Receiver architecture used for spoofing detection 
???
The least squares problem formulated by (4) is known in the 
literature as the Wahba's problem. A computationally 
effective solution of the problem is available using the 
singular value decomposition (SVD) technique [12]. 
As proposed in [3] the quality of the solution for the antenna 
attitude can be assessed using the sum of squares of errors 
(SSE) test statistics in a similar way as within receiver 
autonomous integrity monitoring (RAIM) techniques. The 
SSE metric is defined as follows 
 
 
ܵܵܧ ൌ 
traceሼൣ܀ሺݎ, ݌, ݕሻۯ െ ۰෡൧୘܀୒ିଵൣ܀ሺݎ, ݌, ݕሻۯ െ ۰෡൧ሽ,    (5)
 
where the inverse of the covariance matrix of the 
measurement noise ܀୒ିଵ		 is used for normalizing individual 
residuals of the least squares solution. In [3] it is assumed that 
the individual DOA measurement errors ܊መ ௡ െ ܊௡ are 
Gaussian and not correlated with each other and the matrix 
܀୒ is a diagonal matrix consisting of the error variances σଵଶ, σଶଶ, … , σேଶ . If no systematic offsets are observed between 
the measured and predicted DOAs of the GNSS signals – i.e. 
if no spoofing is present – the SSE metric defined by (5) 
follows a central chi-squared distribution with ݇ ൌ 	 ሺ2ܰ െ 3ሻ 
degrees of freedom. In the complementary case, if all or some 
of the measured DOAs are biased with respects to predicted 
DOAs – i.e. if spoofing is present – the SSE metric follows a 
non-central chi-squared distribution with the same number of 
degrees of freedom as above but with some non-zero non-
centrality parameter λ: 
 
H଴ሺno	errorሻ:		ܵܵܧ~߯ଶሺ݇ሻ 
Hଵሺerrorሻ:								ܵܵܧ~߯ᇱଶሺ݇, ߣሻ 
݇ ൌ 	 ሺ2ܰ െ 3ሻ 
ߣ ൌ ෍൬Δ௡ߪ௡൰
ଶே
௡ୀଵ
 
  (6) 
 
where  
 
Δ௡ is the bias in the ݊-th DOA measurement, this bias is 
expressed as a spatial angle ߰௡ between two direction 
cosines vectors of the measured DOA ܊መ ௡ and the 
predicted “almanac” DOA ܊௡:  
 
 
Δ௡ ൌ ߰௡ ൌ arccos ൏ ܊መ ௡, ܊௡ ൐ ,   (7) 
 
 
ߪ௡ is the standard deviation of the ݊-th DOA measurement 
error given in units of the spatial angle ߰௡.  
 
An example of probability density functions (pdfs) of the ܵܵܧ 
test statistics for H଴ and Hଵ hypothesis are shown in Fig. 2. 
These numerical results were obtained by Monte Carlo 
simulations of DOA measurements for seven GNSS satellites 
[3]. In simulations for the Hଵ case, a single bias was 
introduced into the fifth DOA measurement: Δହ ൌ 12.5° so 
that 	ሺΔହ ߪହ⁄ ሻଶ ൌ 34.17.  
 
As can be observed in Fig. 2, the detection of the systematic 
biases in DOA measurements can be performed by using 
standard fixed alarm rate hypothesis testing, i.e. by setting a 
threshold for the SSE test metric defined by some desired 
false alarm rate. The presence of the systematic biases can 
then serve as one of indications of spoofer / meaconing 
attacks.  
 
In [2] it is shown how a reliable identification of all spoofed 
signals can be performed based on above explained hypo-
theses testing. In a systematic way all possible hypotheses 
about spoofed subsets of satellite signals are analyzed and the 
largest unspoofed subset of satellite signals is identified.        
 
 
III. Direction Of Arrival Estimation and  
Estimation Error Model 
 
A. Methodology for DOA Estimation Error Analysis 
The estimation approach of (4) which was revisited in Section 
II and introduced in [2][3][4] is based on several implicit 
assumptions about the statistics of the DOA estimation errors. 
One of the most important assumptions is that the error vector 
܊መ ௡ െ ܊௡ is white Gaussian distributed with equal distribution 
for all satellite signals ݊ ൌ 1…ܰ,	 i.e. it is assumed that each 
DOA is estimated with equal quality and isotropic error 
behaviour.  
  
Fig. 2 Pdfs of SSE test metric of (5) for H0  and H1 
hypotheses 
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These assumptions are made for sake of simplicity and are 
driven by the need to keep the mathematical derivations 
traceable.  However, in reality due to physical limits it is in 
question how far these assumptions hold. The accuracy of 
direction-of-arrival estimation in planar antenna arrays is 
highly elevation dependent. Due to electromagnetic coupling 
between antenna elements the estimation accuracy of DOAs 
may also heavily vary over azimuth. The latter applies 
especially for miniaturized antenna arrays with antenna 
element spacing well below half of the wavelength of the 
used radio waves. Moreover, the resolution of DOA 
estimation in planar arrays may differ for the azimuth and 
elevation component.  
In order to clarify these questions about the DOA estimation 
error statistics real measurement data was captured with a 
multi antenna setup and processed in order to determine DOA 
estimation error statistics. The data was captured using the 
multi antenna GNSS receiver GALANT of the German 
Aerospace Center (DLR), see Fig. 3 a. This receiver was 
developed by DLR for applications with safety of life content. 
The receiver performs individual beamforming and performs 
direction of arrival (DOA) estimation after the correlation 
process for all tracked satellites. The real-time receiver is 
described in detail in [8]. For investigating the direction of 
arrival estimation error and its statistics the 2-by-2 rectangular 
adaptive antenna of the DLR GALANT receiver was mounted 
on the roof of the building of the DLR Institute of 
Communications and Navigation in Oberpfaffenhofen, 
Germany (see Fig. 3 b).  The DLR receiver makes use of a 
two-dimensional Unitary ESPRIT algorithm [9][10] for DOA 
estimation. This choice is motivated by the high 
computational efficiency of this super resolution technique, 
which makes it attractive for real-time application, and the 
ability to separate coherent signals by using forward-
backward averaging, which is helpful to cope with multipath. 
The 2D Unitary ESPRIT algorithm is implemented in the 
baseband software of the receiver in the post-correlation part 
of the signal processing chain. 
Blocks of the array signal data were collected in each multi-
antenna satellite tracking channel and used in the post-
processing by a direction finding technique. The data blocks 
were collected simultaneously for 12 satellites signals being 
tracked by the receiver. Each array signal sample consists of 
complex-value outputs of four prompt PRN-code correlators. 
A single data block corresponds to the 20 ms of observation 
time. 
 
B. Analysis Results and Error Model 
 
In order to evaluate the characteristics of the DOA estimation 
error, the corresponding measurements of the GALANT 
receiver have been continuously recorded over 48 hours. For 
each epoch within this time the DOA measurement of every 
tracked satellite signal has been performed using the ESPRIT 
algorithm.  The reference DOAs for the error calculation have 
been obtained by using a long-time average of the attitude of 
the GALANT antenna and the satellite ephemeris 
information. The DOA estimation error is then determined as 
the enclosed angle between the measured and the reference 
DOAs.  
 
Fig. 6 gives an overview of the achieved results. As a 
function of azimuth and elevation of the considered satellite 
signal measured in the local antenna coordinate frame, the 
angular root mean square error (RMSE) of the DOA 
estimation is depicted.  The individual plot for the azimuth 
and elevation components of the DOA estimation errors are 
shown in Fig. 4.  
 
On the one hand it can be observed that a strong dependency 
between estimation error and elevation angle exists. On the 
other hand, the dependency of the DOA estimation error on 
azimuth turns out to be minor. Since the used antenna array is 
a planar array the result is not surprising. Due to physical 
limits the resolution of DOA estimation for very low 
elevations, i.e. for grazing incidence of the wave, is much 
a) 
 
b) 
 
Fig. 3 View on  
(a) GALANT multi-antenna receiver and  
(b) antenna array roof installation 
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lower than for high elevations, i.e. for boresight reception. 
Since the antenna pattern of the antenna array does not show 
a significant dependency over azimuth [8] also no significant 
dependency of the DOA estimation errors can be observed. 
However, when using antenna arrays which are even more 
miniaturized with significant electromagnetic coupling effects 
among the antenna elements also a more dominant azimuth 
dependency could be expected.  
 
Within this paper we put our focus on the dependency of the 
DOA estimation error on the elevation within the local 
antenna coordinate frame and neglect the minor dependency 
on the azimuth. Setting out from this observation we analyze 
the DOA estimation error with respect to its components in 
elevation and azimuth direction. Fig. 5 shows the results for 
the entire data set as a function of elevation both for the 
azimuth and the elevation component. Several observations 
can be made: 
 
1) Azimuth and elevation component follow different 
statistics with respect to the distribution of the DOA 
error. The typical error of the azimuth component is 
smaller than the error in the elevation component. 
2) The elevation dependency of the elevation component is 
significant. Especially for low elevations up to 30° the 
estimation error is significantly higher than for higher 
elevations. 
3) The error distribution of the azimuth component is 
almost independent of the elevation. Only for very high 
elevations above 80° the error in the azimuth component 
seems to be higher. However, this result is caused by the 
natural effect of convergent lines of longitude for high 
elevations.  
 
Neglecting the azimuthal dependency and using the 
measurement results presented in Fig. 4 a simple over-
bounding Gaussian model for the angular DOA estimation 
error can be derived as follows: 
 
 
  2 degreeRMS 90 N 1 eK
     
       
 2
1 2
190
N 1
0.175, 0.0436,
e .K 
 
   
 
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(8)
 
a) b) 
   
Fig. 4 Overview of DOA estimation error vs. elevation; a) azimuth component, b) elevation component 
 a) b) 
           
 
Fig. 5 Statistical description of DOA estimation error vs. elevation; a) azimuth component, b) elevation component 
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In (8) the variable	ߠ denotes the satellite elevation in degrees 
and ߪଽ଴ the standard deviation of the DOA estimation error in 
zenith. The latter depends on various side conditions like the 
signal-to-noise ratio of the signal for which the DOA is 
estimated etc. Moreover, the model (8) depends on the 
parameter K which characterizes how strongly the DOA 
estimation error varies with elevation.  
For the set of measurement data analyzed within the paper the 
zenith DOA estimation error ߪଽ଴	was 2.3364° and the 
parameter K was one. The fit of this model to the observed 
DOA estimation error is shown in Fig. 7a). By varying the 
choice for the parameter K also antennas can be described 
with weaker or stronger dependency of the DOA estimation 
error on elevation. This will later be used within our analysis 
to quantify the sensitivity of the considered algorithms with 
respect to this elevation dependency. This generalized model 
of the DOA estimation error is depicted in Fig. 7b). 
 
 
 
 
IV. Extended Antenna Based Joint Attitude Estimation 
and Spoofing Detection 
 
A. Novel Technique for Spoofing Detection 
1. Mathematical derivation and description 
As shown in Section III the quality of DOA estimation results 
significantly differ among the satellite signals. The main 
influence seen is related to the elevation in the local antenna 
coordinate system under which the satellite signal is received. 
The technique revisited in Section II cannot cope with these 
side conditions. Therefore, setting out from the results of  
Section II it is the purpose of this section to present a novel 
extended technique for joint attitude estimation and spoofing 
detection which can take different qualities of DOA 
estimation results into account.  
Coming back to (2) the impact of DOA estimation errors can 
be described by rotation noise according to  
 
 ܊መ ௡ ൌ ܀௡ࣨ ܀ሺݎ, ݌, ݕሻ܉௡ᇣᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇥ
ୀ܊೙
,  1 ൑ ݊ ൑ ܰ. (9)
We assume, that the DOA estimation error 
 ࢔ୠ,௡ ൌ ܊መ ௡ െ ܊௡, (10)
is small, i.e. ฮ࢔ୠ,௡ฮ ≪ 1 holds. In this case the nonlinear 
transformation ܊መ ௡ ൌ ܀௡ࣨ ܊௡for expressing the rotational noise 
can be well approximated by linear Taylor approximation 
according to  
 ܊መ ௡ ൌ ܊௡ ൅ ۰^,௡࢔௡. (11)
 
 
a) b) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 7 Derived model for DOA estimation error; a) fitting curve for measurement data, b) generalized version 
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Fig. 6 Angular RMSE of DOA estimation 
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meas
model DOA,90 2.3364  
K = 0.0, 0.25,0.5,0.75,
    1.0,.1.25,1.5,2.0 
DOA,90 2.3364  
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In (11) the matrix ۰^,௡ describes a local set of basis vectors 
corresponding to the true DOA expressed by ܊௡, which span 
a local coordinate system. In this local coordinate system the 
first component is in direction of local azimuth, the second 
one in direction of local elevation and the third one in radial 
direction, see Fig. 8. The error vector ࢔௡	in (11) expresses the 
DOA error components in azimuth, elevation and radial 
direction and is measured in radiant. 
The covariance matrix of the error vector ࢔௡	of (11)  reads     
 ۱୬,௡ ൌ Eሼ	࢔௡ ࢔௡୘ሽ, (12)
where ൣ۱୬,௡൧ଵ,ଵis the variance of the azimuth error, 
	ൣ۱୬,௡൧ଶ,ଶthe variance of the elevation error and  ൣ۱୬,௡൧ଷ,ଷthe 
variance in radial direction. The variance in radial direction is 
much smaller than the variances in azimuth and elevation 
direction since rotational noise mainly influences the azimuth 
and elevation components of the DOA estimation error ࢔ୠ,௡ 
of (10). Stacking equations (11) for all satellite signals 
݊ ൌ 1…ܰ one obtains 
 vec൛۰෡ൟ ൌ vecሼ۰ሽ ൅ ۰^࢔. (13)
In (13) “vec{.}” denotes the vectorial operator. This operator 
takes a matrix as argument and outputs a vector, which is 
constituted by stacking all columns of the matrix. Moreover 
also the matrix 
 ۰^ ൌ blockdiag൫۰^,ଵ …۰^,ே൯ (14)
and the error vector  
 ࢔ ൌ ሺ࢔ଵ୘ …࢔ே୘ሻ୘ (15)
are obtained by combining the satellite specific quantities. 
The covariance matrix of the combined error vector ࢔ of (15) 
reads 
 ۱୬ ൌ blockdiag൫۱୬,ଵ …۱୬,ே൯. (16)
In the following we assume that the DOA estimation error 
measured in the local coordinate system of Fig. 4 is Gaussian 
distributed. In this case the probability distribution of ࢔ of 
(15) can be described by the generalized multivariant 
Gaussian distribution 
 
 pܖሺ࢔ሻ ൌ ૚√૛࣊૜ࡺୢୣ୲ሺ۱౤ሻ ࢋ
ି૚૛ሺ࢔షࣆሻ౐۱౤ష૚ሺ࢔షࣆሻ, (17)
 
where ۱୬ is the covariance matrix of (16) and  ࣆ is the vector 
describing the mean of the distribution. Setting out from the 
results of Fig. 5 we can conclude that the mean is close to 
zero and can, therefore, be neglected in the following. 
 
Based on the DOA estimation error distribution of (17) the 
maximum likelihood estimate (ML estimate) 
 ሺ̂ݎ, ݌̂, ݕොሻ ൌ arg max∀ሺ௥,௣,௬ሻ p൫۰෡|ሺݎ, ݌, ݕሻ൯ (18)
of the unknown Euler angles r, p and y can be defined. Using 
(13) one obtains 
 p൫۰෡|ሺݎ, ݌, ݕሻ൯ ൌ pܖ൫࢔ ൌ ۰^ି૚vec൛۰෡ െ ܀ሺݎ, ݌, ݕሻۯൟ൯ (19)
Substituting (17) and (19) in (18) we get  
 ሺ̂ݎ, ݌̂, ݕොሻ ൌ arg min∀ሺ௥,௣,௬ሻvec୘൛۰෡ െ ܀ሺݎ, ݌, ݕሻۯൟ ∙
∙ ۰^ି૚୘۱୬ି૚۰^ି૚ᇣᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇥ
ୀ࡯ష૚
vec൛۰෡ െ ܀ሺݎ, ݌, ݕሻۯൟ (20)
as the final result for the ML estimate of the Euler angles, 
which takes the individual quality of the DOA estimation 
errors into account. The solution of (20) can be determined 
following an iterative approach as described in [2]. 
 
2. Special cases of the novel technique 
Let’s for a moment have a look onto two special cases of 
(20). First lets’s consider uncorrelated, identically and 
isotropically distributed noise. In this case ۱୬ of (16) is a 
scaled identity matrix. Plugging this choice for  ۱୬ into (20) 
one obtains 
 ሺ̂ݎ, ݌̂, ݕොሻ ൌ arg min∀ሺ௥,௣,௬ሻvec୘൛۰෡ െ ܀ሺݎ, ݌, ݕሻۯൟ ∙  
                                            vec൛۰෡ െ ܀ሺݎ, ݌, ݕሻۯൟ  
                       = arg min∀ሺ௥,௣,௬ሻฮ۰෡ െ ܀ሺݎ, ݌, ݕሻۯฮଶ
ଶ. 
(21)
    
Fig. 8 Definition of a local set of basis vectors 
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The result of (21) is identical to the result of (4), i.e. for the 
considered special case the generalized novel technique 
proposed in this section converges towards the state-of-the-art 
technique revisited in Section II. 
Let’s now have a look onto the more realistic and relevant 
case in which individual satellite signals show different levels 
of error in the DOA estimation. We assume that for the 
covariance matrix ۱୬,௡ of (12) for satellite signal n 
 ۱୬,௡ ൌ ߪ௡૛۷ሺଷ୶ଷሻ (22)
holds. From (22) follows for the covariance matrix of the 
combined error vector of (16)  
 
۱ ൌ ቌ
ߪଵଶ 0 00 ⋱ 0
0 0 ߪேଶ
ቍ
ᇣᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇥ
ୀ܅ష૛
Ä	۷ሺଷ୶ଷሻ. (23)
In (23) the symbol “Ä” denotes the Kronecker product of 
matrices and vectors. Substituting (23) in (20) one obtains 
 ሺ̂ݎ, ݌̂, ݕොሻ ൌ arg min∀ሺ௥,௣,௬ሻvec୘൛൫۰෡ െ ܀ሺݎ, ݌, ݕሻۯ൯܅ൟ ∙
                                      vec൛൫۰෡ െ ܀ሺݎ, ݌, ݕሻۯ൯܅ൟ 
                 = arg min∀ሺ௥,௣,௬ሻ	ฮ൫۰෡ െ ܀ሺݎ, ݌, ݕሻۯ൯܅ฮଶ
ଶ
 
(24)
 
for the ML estimate. By some matrix arithmetics (24) can be 
further simplified to 
 ሺ̂ݎ, ݌̂, ݕොሻ ൌ arg min∀ሺ௥,௣,௬ሻ	trace ቄ܅୘൫۰෡ െ
																						܀ሺݎ, ݌, ݕሻۯ൯୘൫۰෡ െ ܀ሺݎ, ݌, ݕሻۯ൯܅ቅ (25)
and 
 ܀෡ ൌ arg max∀܀∈ௌைሺଷሻ	trace	 ቄ൫۰෡܅൯
୘܀ሺݎ, ݌, ݕሻۯ܅ቅ
						ൌ arg max∀܀∈ௌைሺଷሻ	trace	 ൝ۯ܅൫۰෡܅൯
୘ᇣᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇥ
ୀ۲
܀ሺݎ, ݌, ݕሻൡ.
  
(26)
The matrix D in (26) reads 
 
۲ ൌ ۯ܅܅܂۰෡܂ ൌ ۯቌ
ߪଵଶ 0 00 ⋱ 0
0 0 ߪேଶ
ቍ۰෡܂. (27)
Solving (26) using the method of Langragian multipliers
yields 
 ܀෡ ൌ ۲୘ሺ۲	۲୘ሻି૚૛ (28)
 
for the optimum rotation matrix. Using the singular value 
decomposition 
 ۲ ൌ ۯ܅܅୘۰෡୘ ൌ ܃઱܄୘ (29)
of D of (27) one obtains a closed-form solution  
 
 ܀෡ ൌ ܄ diagሺ1, 1, det	ሺ܃܄୘ሻሻ	܃୘. (30)
The optimum Euler angles can be determined based on the 
optimum rotation matrix by [11] 
 
 
tan ̂ݎ ൌ െ
ൣ܀෡൧ଵ,ଷ
ൣ܀෡൧ଷ,ଷ
, tan ݌̂ ൌ െ
ൣ܀෡൧ଶ,ଷ
ටൣ܀෡൧ଶ,ଵ
૛ ൅ ൣ܀෡൧ଶ,ଶ
૛
,
tan ݕො ൌ െ
ൣ܀෡൧ଶ,ଵ
ൣ܀෡൧ଶ,ଶ
. 
(31)
Equation (30) in combination with (27) and (31) describes the 
optimum technique for joint spoofing detection and attitude 
estimation if the quality of the DOA estimation errors differs 
among satellite signals.  
 
B. Analysis Results  
The performance of the new technique is analyzed by means 
of Monte Carlo computer simulations. A scenario with 11 
satellites is considered, see Fig. 9. The unknown antenna 
attitude to be estimated is 
 ݎ ൌ 10°, p = 5°, y = 100°. (32)
For the simulation scenario the standard deviation of the 
DOA estimation error was chosen in accordance to the 
generalized model of (8). We varied the choice of parameter 
K in wide ranges in order to study the influence of different 
types of antennas with different elevation dependency on the 
analysis results. Fig. 10 shows the resulting error in attitude 
determination as a function of the parameter ܭ. 
  
Fig. 9 Considered scenario with 11 satellites 
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The improvements achievable by considering weighting 
during the attitude determination step can be clearly seen. 
 
 
C. Spoofing Mitigation using Spatial Processing 
In a multi antenna receiver the impact of spoofing can be 
mitigated by spatial processing [3]. For this purpose nulls in 
the antenna diagram can be steered to suppress the influence 
of identified spoofing sources. If the direction to the spoofing 
source has been estimated by means of the techniques 
described in the sections above, the spatial zero can be 
generated by applying an orthogonal projection P^  into the 
null sub-space of the array steering vector ܉ሺߠ, ߮ሻ that 
corresponds to the spoofer direction 
 
 P^ ൌ ۷ െ ܉ሺ܉ୌ܉ሻି૚܉ୌ,	ܠොሾ݊ሿ ൌ 	P^ܠሾ݊ሿ, (33)
where ܠሾ݊ሿ	 stands for the array output vector at correlation 
epoch ݊. 
In the following this approach is validated by means of the 
DLR multi antenna receiver GALANT [18]. The setup and 
configuration is similar to the one described in Section III. 
Besides the null steering described above, an Eigenbeam-
forming approach was utilized to generate the antenna array 
weights [17], i.e. for adapting the reception pattern of the 
antenna array. The GPS constellation at the start of recording 
of the IF samples is shown in Fig. 11. A GNSS repeater was 
used to inject spoofed / repeated signals from boresight 
direction. 
Fig. 12 shows examples of the normalized array reception 
patterns in different satellite channel without and with the 
spatial null. It can clearly be seen how the spoofed signal is 
suppressed by applying spatial processing. 
 
 
Fig. 10 Mean attitude error (spatial separation angle) 
vs. parameter K of the generalized error model 
 
Fig. 11 GPS constellation at start of signal recording 
 
 
Fig. 12 Examples of array reception pattern without 
and with spatial null 
 
 
Fig. 13 Planar positioning error under spoofing 
conditions with and without adaptive nulling 
???
In Fig. 13 the resulting solutions in the position domain are 
shown. Without placing spatial nulls the impact of the spoofer 
/ repeater on the position is clearly visible. In case of 
activated spatial nulling the systematic position error caused 
by the spoofer is avoided and accurate position estimates are 
determined. 
 
V. Sequential Processing 
 
 
A. Sequential Technique for Spoofing Detection 
In typical scenarios in mobility on land, on sea and in the air, 
the attitude of the user platform (e.g. vehicle, ship, aircraft) 
does not change suddenly but with limited turn rates and turn 
rate changes. Therefore, the knowledge about attitude in a 
certain epoch can be exploited for the attitude estimation in 
following epochs as a priori knowledge. In this section, the 
snapshot based techniques introduced in the previous sections 
will be further extended to a new sequential technique for 
joint spoofing detection and attitude estimation which 
exploits the limited changes in attitude.  
For that purpose we introduce the state vector 
 
ܠ࢑ ൌ
ۉ
ۈۈ
ۇ
ݎ
݌
ݕ
ݎሶ
݌ሶ
ݕሶی
ۋۋ
ۊ
 (34)
 
which contains the three Euler angles r, p, y describing the 
attitude of the antenna platform as well as the corresponding 
turn rates ݎሶ , ݌ሶ  and ݕሶ . With the time T describing the duration 
of one measurement and update interval the state transition 
model 
 
ܠ௞ ൌ
ۉ
ۈۈ
ۇ
1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 1
ܶ 0 0
0 ܶ 0
0 0 ܶ0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 1ی
ۋۋ
ۊܠ௞ିଵ ൅ ࢝௞ (35)
 
can be introduced describing the change in attitude from 
update step k-1 to k. In (35) the vector ࢝௞ denotes the process 
noise. The relationship between the measurements ۰෡ of (13) 
and the state vector ܠ௞ of (34) is modelled by the non-linear 
measurement model 
 
 ܢ෤௞ ൌ vec൛۰෡ൟ ൌ ࢎሺܠ௞, ܞ௞ሻ ൌ ܀ୡ	vecሼۯሽ (36)
 
 
using the measurement noise vector ܞ௞ , where 
 
 ܀ୡ ൌ blockdiag൫܀ୡ,ଵ … ܀ୡ,ே൯	,				 
܀ୡ,௡ ൌ ܀൫ݎሺܠ௞ሻ ൅ ݊୰,௡, ݌ሺܠ௞ሻ ൅ ݊୮,௡, ݕሺܠ௞ሻ ൅ ݊୷,௡൯.
(37)
 
Equations (34) to (37) describe an extended Kalman filter 
which can be evaluated by means of the standard steps 
depicted in Fig. 14 and detailed in [19]. The analysis of 
achievable performance gains by going from a snapshot based 
to a sequential technique is subject to further research and 
will be presented in the next paper.  
 
 
VI. Conclusions and Outlook 
It was shown in the paper that the estimation error in 
direction-of-arrival (DOA) estimation are highly dependent 
on the DOA to be estimated. Therefore, it is highly advised to 
incorporate the knowledge about differences in the quality of 
DOA estimates in a joint spoofing detection and attitude 
estimation process. It was shown in the paper that the 
approaches for joint spoofing detection and attitude 
estimation known from literature can be generalized to cope 
with this new side information. Corresponding improvement 
gains can be achieved.  
Since attitude cannot change suddenly over time further 
improvements can be gained by extending the proposed 
generalized approach to a sequential technique. As shown in 
the paper this extension can be achieved by following an 
extended Kalman filter based approach.  
Using the history of attitude changes as well as about spoofed 
and unspoofed subsets of GNSS signals allows further 
reducing the complexity of the overall process. Having 
knowledge about trustful GNSS signal subsets from previous 
epochs as well as about spoofed signal subsets allows 
breaking down the average number of hypotheses to be tested 
in the process significantly. The detailed analysis of this 
potential for complexity reduction is subject of further 
research. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 14 Steps of the Extended Kalman filter [19] using 
the state transition model of (35) and the 
measurement model of (36) 
???
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